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Abstract
Background: Screening at hospital admission for carriage of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) has been
proposed as a strategy to reduce nosocomial infections. The objective of this study was to determine the long-term costs
and health benefits of selective and universal screening for MRSA at hospital admission, using both PCR-based and
chromogenic media-based tests in various settings.
Methodology/Principal Findings: A simulation model of MRSA transmission was used to determine costs and effects over
15 years from a US healthcare perspective. We compared admission screening together with isolation of identified carriers
against a baseline policy without screening or isolation. Strategies included selective screening of high risk patients or
universal admission screening, with PCR-based or chromogenic media-based tests, in medium (5%) or high nosocomial
prevalence (15%) settings. The costs of screening and isolation per averted MRSA infection were lowest using selective
chromogenic-based screening in high and medium prevalence settings, at $4,100 and $10,300, respectively. Replacing the
chromogenic-based test with a PCR-based test costs $13,000 and $36,200 per additional infection averted, and subsequent
extension to universal screening with PCR would cost $131,000 and $232,700 per additional infection averted, in high and
medium prevalence settings respectively. Assuming $17,645 benefit per infection averted, the most cost-saving strategies in
high and medium prevalence settings were selective screening with PCR and selective screening with chromogenic,
respectively.
Conclusions/Significance: Admission screening costs $4,100–$21,200 per infection averted, depending on strategy and
setting. Including financial benefits from averted infections, screening could well be cost saving.
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Introduction
Staphylococcus aureus is one of the most common causes of nosocomial
and community-acquired infections. Since the 1980s, methicillin-
resistant S. aureus (MRSA) nosocomial prevalence levels have increased
in most countries [1–3]. An estimated 25,100 nosocomial MRSA
infections occurred in the US in 2005 [4], and have been associated
with higher costs, higher mortality and an increased length of stay than
infections with methicillin-susceptible S. aureus (MSSA) [5,6].
The low nosocomial prevalence in Scandinavian countries and
the Netherlands has been ascribed to stringent policies to control
the spread of MRSA. Bootsma et al. have investigated the
contribution of different components of the Dutch Search and
Destroy policy [7], indicating that admission screening can
effectively reduce MRSA in high prevalence settings [8]. In
clinical studies selective screening on admission to intensive care
units (ICUs) or universal screening at hospital admission yielded
conflicting results [9–15]. Universal admission screening might be
an economically viable option through prevention of MRSA
infections and its associated costs [15], but has not been widely
adopted because of the presumed high costs associated with testing
and subsequent isolation [16].
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 March 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 3 | e14783Several detection tests are now commercially available, each
with different test characteristics and costs. The impact and
relative importance of a test’s sensitivity, specificity and test delay
depend on the screening strategy used and the MRSA prevalence
in the catchment population. Here, we used a modeling approach
to assist hospital administrators in informed decision making on
the implementation of an admission screening strategy.
The objectives were (1) to estimate the costs of screening and
isolation per infection averted for various admission screening
strategies, (2) to compare two MRSA detection tests within these
strategies and (3) to investigate the relative importance of test
sensitivity, specificity and test delay. Our analysis focused on the
United States.
Study design
We performed an analysis of costs and effects of universal and
selective MRSA screening at hospital admission, combined with
isolation of identified MRSA carriers, over a timeframe of 15
years, using a 3% annual discount rate [17]. We compared
strategies both to each other and to a baseline without screening or
isolation. The analysis was conducted from a US hospital’s
perspective, and costs are reported in US dollars using price levels
of the year 2007.
We used a previously published [8] discrete event simulation
model developed with C++, reflecting MRSA transmission within
hospitals, to estimate the health and economic outcome of
screening and isolation. The incremental cost-effectiveness ratio
(iCER) of selected strategies was calculated as the difference in
screening and isolation costs divided by the difference in infections,
of one strategy over another. We also present the average cost
effectiveness ratios (aCERs) for each strategy, calculated as the
costs of screening and isolation costs divided by the difference in
MRSA infections, relative to a baseline of no screening and no
isolation. As our main outcome measure is the investment costs per
infection averted, we counted up-front investment costs of
screening and isolation (e.g., lab tests and contact precautions),
but excluded cost consequences of averting MRSA infection, such
as a shorter hospital stay and averted treatment costs. Instead, we
compare estimated investment costs with financial benefits of
averted MRSA infections.
Overview of the simulation model
Below, we present a brief overview of the model, a more
detailed account is available elsewhere [8]. Parameter estimates
are based on data obtained in the University Medical Center
Utrecht, the Netherlands, unless specified otherwise. The model
simulates three hospitals, each with 693 beds (36 18-bed wards and
5 9-bed intensive care units (ICUs)) with a 100% bed-occupancy.
The mean length of stay was assumed at 3 and 7 days within ICUs
and regular wards, respectively (exponentially distributed). Each
hospital has a catchment population of 220,000 individuals, of
which 20,000 are known ‘high risk’ individuals that have a 10
times higher probability of being admitted to the hospital,
compared to the non-‘high risk’ individuals. This leads on average
to a hospital population of 50% ‘high risk’ and 50% non-‘high risk’
patients. Additionally, ‘high-risk’ patients are characterized by a
life expectancy of 20 years versus 78 years for non-‘high-risk’
patients. One can think of the high-risk group as elderly together
with immunocompromised patients. Unidentified hospitalized
carriers have a daily probability of 3% of being detected through
conventional microbiological cultures obtained for clinical reasons
[8]. Individuals identified as MRSA carrier during a hospitaliza-
tion are ‘flagged’, so that they are identified as such on a next
admission.
MRSA transmission occurs primarily via patient-to-patient
transmission mediated by the hands of health care workers
(HCWs). The adherence of HCWs to the hand-washing protocol is
assumed to be constant over time. Transmission is 20 times more
likely to occur within a given hospital unit, compared to
transmission between units. Transmission can also occur via
HCWs who are colonized in the nose/throat [18]. In a high
prevalence setting, this route is set to be 8 times less important as
patient-to-patient transmission. Finally, the transmission rate in
ICUs is assumed to be 3 times higher (for both routes) compared to
other wards, due to more frequent contacts between HCWs and
patients and the higher susceptibility of ICU patients. The
transmission parameters were calibrated to obtain a steady-state
nosocomial prevalence of 15% at baseline (high prevalence).
We used an average daily probability of developing an infection
of 0.59% for a hospitalized carrier [19]. Coello et al. report that
half of the 68 infections occured within 12 days. We can derive a
daily probability of 0.59% by dividing the number of infection
(68/2=34) by the total time at risk (479 patients * 12 days =5748
days). This results in an infection rate of 8.9 per 10,000 bed days at
baseline with 15% nosocomial prevalence. Infection status was not
explicitly modeled and, therefore, infected patients had the same
infectiousness and discharge probabilities as MRSA carriers. We
evaluated all screening strategies in a high and medium
nosocomial prevalence setting of initially 15% [20–23] and 5%
[24], respectively. This prevalence is defined as the percentage of
positive findings when performing a cross sectional screening of all
patients in the hospital with a perfect test. For the high prevalence
setting, the screening program was initiated after a simulation time
of 10 years. This period was used to avoid major effects of the
exact initial conditions and to reach a steady state nosocomial
prevalence of 15%. This prevalence level corresponds to 5.5%
prevalence upon hospital admission. In the medium prevalence
setting, the simulations were started using a prevalence ,1%, and
the screening program was initiated when the average nosocomial
prevalence in the three hospitals reached 5% for the first time. The
outcome of our stochastic model is presented for one hospital with
693 beds, as the mean of 1000 simulations for each strategy over
the full timeframe of 15 years. The 2-sided 95% uncertainty
intervals (UIs) cover the results observed in 95% of the simulations.
Baseline
At baseline there is neither active screening for MRSA nor
isolation of identified or suspected carriers. The nosocomial
prevalence remained at a steady state of 15% over the entire time
frame in high prevalence settings. As a baseline for the medium
prevalence setting, we assumed a steady-state prevalence of 5%
over the time frame, although without interventions the prevalence
would continue to rise to the high prevalence level.
Admission screening and isolation
We evaluated ‘Selective’ screening of ‘high risk’ patients and
‘flagged’ patients only, as well as ‘Universal’ screening of all
patients. Both strategies were evaluated with a PCR-based test and
a chromogenic media-based test (see table 1 for test characteris-
tics). We define test delay as the time between collection of
specimens and the reporting of results to the wards, which includes
transport and laboratory time. We assumed a test delay of 0.5 day
for PCR, and 1.5 and 2.5 days for the chromogenic media-based
test after 24 and 48 hours of incubation, respectively. One swab is
taken from patients at admission which is subsequently tested for
MRSA Screening Strategies
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Identified MRSA carriers are isolated in single rooms, and are not
decolonized during their hospital stay. We assumed no limits on
isolation capacity to allow the peak isolation capacity required for
each screening strategy to be determined by the model.
Base-case assumptions
To simulate a regionally implemented MRSA screening policy,
all three hospitals in the model are assumed to implement identical
screening strategies at the same time. The chromogenic media-
based test is evaluated after 24 and 48 hours of incubation.
Patients with positive results are isolated at both time points, with
the last result after 48 hours being considered final. Pre-emptive
isolation, defined as isolation upon readmission for the duration of
the test delay until confirmed negative for carriage of MRSA, is
limited to ‘flagged’ patients only. Single room isolation is assumed
to reduce the risk of transmission by 80% [8].
Scenario analysis
We additionally investigate four alternatives to our base-case
assumptions: (1) full pre-emptive isolation, that includes pre-
emptive isolation for ‘high risk’ as well as ‘flagged’ patients; (2) the
absence of pre-emptive isolation; (3) only 1 out of the 3 hospitals in
the model implements screening; (4) screening with a chromogenic
media-based test, using only the results after 24 h of incubation.
Cost data
The total investment cost borne by the hospital is assumed to
consist of the additional cost of isolation plus the cost of screening.
The screening and isolation costs were calculated by multiplying
estimated resource use (including labor) by unit prices (table 2)
(source: bureau of labor statistics, US department of labor). The
prices of consumables were provided by the manufacturers. The
costs of isolation were calculated assuming that facilities for single
room isolation are available, thereby excluding the capital costs of
building new infrastructure. The isolation costs consist of contact
precautions and additional cleaning of the room in case of a
positive screening test. The costs of the screening program consist
of tests, laboratory labor, laboratory equipment, labor of taking
swabs and of a clinical risk assessment when screening selectively
(table 2).
Sensitivity analysis
In a one-way sensitivity analysis we investigated the impact of
alternately varying the test sensitivity (50–100%), specificity (50–
100%) and test delay (0–5 days), on the costs and infections
averted. Additionally, we investigated the impact of varying key
model parameters on the aCER. The sensitivity analysis was
conducted using the strategy selective screening with PCR in a
high prevalence setting.
Results
Screening strategies
Relative to baseline, all strategies reduced MRSA prevalence in
the first years of screening, yielding prevalence rates below 1%
after 15 years (figure 1). The number of patients screened over this
period was roughly 200,000 and 400,000 per hospital for selective
screening and universal screening, respectively.
Percentages of patients in isolation over time are characterized
by a peak at the start of the screening program (figure 1). The peak
Table 1. Test characteristics.
Test Sensitivity [28] Specificity [28] Test delay (days)
PCR 92.5 97.0 0.5
Chromogenic
1
At 24 h 78.3 98.6 1.5
At 48 h 87.6 94.7 2.5
1 The chromogenic media-based test is evaluated after 24 and 48 hours of
incubation. Patients with positive results are isolated at both time points, with
the last result after 48 hours being considered final.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014783.t001
Table 2. Resource use and costs of screening and isolation in
US$ (2007).
Item Units Costs ($)
Screening
Take swab by nurse [13] 5 (min) 3.1
Clinical risk assessment by nurse
1 5 (min) 3.1
Transport swab 1 0.35
Fixed screening costs 6.55
Screening – PCR
PCR - test cost per sample 1 24.0
PCR - test clinical lab. technician
time per sample [34]
1.5 (min) 0.76
Fixed screening costs 6.55
Total cost per patient 31.3
PCR - annual cost real-time PCR equipment
2 1 4,315
Screening – Chromogenic
Chromogenic - test cost per sample 1 3.5
Chromogenic - clinical lab. technician
time per sample [35]
11.1 (min) 5.6
Fixed screening costs 6.55
Total cost per patient 15.7
Isolation
Contact precautions materials per day
3 12 12.4
Contact precautions additional
nurse time per day [11]
36 (min) 22.3
Contact precautions additional
physician time per day [9]
10 (min) 13.7
Total cost per patient 48.4
Cleaning of room
4 30 (min) 7.4
1 The time required to estimate the risk of being a carrier was based on factors
such as hospital admission within last 12 months or transfer from another
healthcare facility (only in case of selective screening).
2 Annual cost based on Smartcycler (Cepheid, Sunnyvale, CA), straight line
depreciation using an interest rate of 4%, a cost of $35,000, a lifetime of 10
years and a resale value of 20%.
3 Total $1.04, including gloves ($0.057), gown ($0.46), mask ($0.27), hair cap
($0.049), disinfectant 75 mL ($0.20) required for each of 12 entries into an
isolation room per day.
4 Additional cleaning costs are only incurred in case of a positive finding.
Labor costs are based on nationwide average hourly wages for registered
nurses ($29.8), physicians ($66.3), clinical laboratory technologists and
technicians ($24.4) and janitors and cleaners ($11.9). (source: bureau of labor
statistics, US department of labor). A 24.3% administration overhead was
applied to all labor costs [36]. Prices of consumables were provided by
manufacturers.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014783.t002
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2.9% to 5.0% for high and medium prevalence, respectively, and
was higher for universal screening than for selective screening
(table 3). The annual costs associated with screening and isolation
decrease over time, and are shown for ‘Selective PCR’ and
‘Selective Chromogenic’ in a high prevalence setting (figure 2).
The screening costs of PCR testing are higher than for
chromogenic testing, but these costs are partially offset by the
lower costs of isolation of ‘Selective PCR’.
The total number of infections at baseline - over the 15 year
timeframe - amounted to 2,753 and 918 for high and medium
prevalence, respectively. Of these infections, the number averted
by the different screening and isolation strategies ranged from
2,085 to 2,252 and from 622 to 709 for high and medium
prevalence, respectively (table 3).
The least costly strategy in terms of the costs per infection
averted is ‘Selective Chromogenic’. The investment costs of this
strategy in a high prevalence setting are $8.7 m and it averts a total
of 2,085 (2,085/2,753=76%) infections compared to baseline
(table 3). In a medium prevalence setting, ‘Selective Chromogenic’
costs $6.4 m and averts 622 (622/918=68%) infections compared
to baseline.
The most effective strategy was ‘Universal PCR’, averting 2,252
(82%) and 709 (77%) infections in high and medium prevalence
settings, respectively. This strategy was also the most costly,
requiring a total investment of $16.3 m and $15.0 m for high and
medium prevalence, respectively.
To visualize comparisons between strategies, we plotted costs
and health gains of each strategy (figure 3). In the high prevalence
setting, the aCER of selective screening of ‘high risk’ patients with
a chromogenic media-based test (‘Selective Chromogenic’),
compared to baseline, is $4,100 per infection averted, which is
represented by line A. Substituting the chromogenic media-based
test by a PCR-based test (‘Selective PCR’), represented by line B,
costs an additional $1.6 m and averts 121 more infections,
resulting in an iCER of ‘Selective PCR’ compared to ‘Selective
Chromogenic’ of $13,000 per additional infection averted. An
extension of ‘Selective PCR’ to all patients (‘Universal PCR’), costs
an additional $6.1 m and averts an additional 46 infections,
resulting in an iCER of $131,000 per infection averted (line C).
In the medium prevalence setting, the aCER - compared to
baseline – of screening ‘high risk’ patients with a chromogenic
based test (‘Selective Chromogenic’) is $10,300 per infection
averted. Substituting the chromogenic media-based test by a PCR-
based test (‘Selective PCR’), represented by line B, costs an
incremental $2.1 m and averts an incremental 59 infections,
resulting in an iCER of ‘Selective PCR’ compared to ‘Selective
Chromogenic’, of $36,200 per additional infection averted. The
incremental returns on investment strongly diminish with an
extension of ‘Selective PCR’ to all patients (‘Universal PCR’), at an
iCER of $232,700 per additional infection averted (line C).
Universal screening with a chromogenic media-based test is
dominated in both settings by selective screening with PCR (i.e.
selective screening with PCR is both cheaper and more effective).
Figure 1. Nosocomial prevalence and patients in isolation over time. The upper graph shows the impact of the screening strategies on the
nosocomial prevalence over time. The lower graph shows the percentage of total patients in isolation over time for each strategy. Both graphs show
the mean of 1000 runs of the model.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014783.g001
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Comparing selective screening with PCR using base-case
assumptions with the individual scenarios (table 4), shows that
extending pre-emptive isolation from ‘flagged’ patients only to all
‘high risk’ patients, averts 35 (+1.4%) additional infections at an
additional cost of $3.6 m (+34.9%). The absence of any pre-
emptive isolation reduces the number of infections averted by 32
(21.4%) and costs by $0.4 m (24.3%). If only one out of the three
hospitals implements screening, the total investment costs are
$ 0.8 m (7.8%) higher than the total investment costs of the 3
hospitals in base case scenario, while the number of infections
averted in the participating hospital diminishes by 254 (211.5%)
(158 infections are averted in each of the non-participating
hospitals). A screening program using only the results of the
chromogenic media-based test at 24 h of incubation, reduces the
number of infections averted by 211 (29.6%) and also costs by
$3.6 m (235.7%), compared to PCR-based screening.
Sensitivity analysis
The investment costs and the infections averted of varying test
sensitivity and specificity from 50% to 100% with increments of
5%, are shown in figure 4 (left panel). A higher test sensitivity
increases the number of infections averted but has very little
impact on costs. A higher specificity strongly reduces costs but has
a minor impact on health outcome. The slight increase in
infections averted with a decreasing specificity is caused by the
higher number of patients that are isolated based on a false
positive test result and are therefore at lower risk of transmission.
The right panel of figure 4 shows the impact of varying the test
delay from 0 to 5 days. For our base-case scenario a higher test
delay reduces the number of infections averted and also increases
costs. Different levels of pre-emptive isolation change the impact of
the test delay. When using ‘full preemptive isolation’, an increasing
test delay causes a slight increase in the number of averted
infections. This can be attributed to the effect of isolating all high
risk patients (,50% of all hospital admissions) for a substantial
part of their hospital stay. Figure 5 shows key model parameters
ranked by the magnitude of their impact on the aCER.
Additionally we investigated the impact of commonly used
discount rates for costs and effects: relative to baseline, a discount
rate of 4% for both costs and effects resulted in aCER increase of
2%. A combination of a discount rate of 4% for costs and 1.5% for
effects resulted in a reduction in the aCER of 16%.
Discussion
Cost savings
The true costs attributable to MRSA infection are unknown and
the appropriate method to determine these costs is debated [16].
Reported additional hospital costs of MRSA infection over no
infection range from $6,709 to $64,216, depending on the type of
infection [6,9,15,25]. Additional hospital costs of MRSA infections
over MSSA infections range from $8,327 to $16,738, depending on
the type of infection [6,25,26]. Using a recently published estimate
of hospital costs ($17,645 translated to US$ 2007) of MRSA
infection over no infection [6], we can compare the financial
benefits of averted infections to the investment costs per infection
Figure 2. Annual cost of screening and isolation, and rate of infection. The annual undiscounted cost in US$ (2007) of strategies ‘Selective
PCR’ (left) and ‘Selective Chromogenic’ (right) in a high prevalence setting. The first two years represent baseline (no screening and no isolation).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014783.g002
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 March 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 3 | e14783averted, and estimate the net benefits (figure 6). If the averted
hospital costs of infection are real savings to the hospital, all
evaluated screening strategies are cost-saving in a high prevalence
setting. The net benefit is estimated at $28.7 m for ‘Selective PCR’,
and $28.1 m for ‘Selective Chromogenic’, followed by $25.2 m for
‘Universal Chromogenic’ and $23.4 m for ‘Universal PCR’. In a
medium prevalence setting, the net benefits are lower; $4.6 m for
‘Selective Chromogenic’ and $3.5 m for ‘Selective PCR’, followed
by $1.0 m for ‘Universal Chromogenic’. ‘Universal PCR’ was not
cost-saving in this setting with a net benefit of $22.5 m.
Additional considerations
Our scenario analysis confirms that admission screening will be
less effective and more costly if neighboring hospitals do not screen
Figure 3. Cost effectiveness planes for the high (top) and medium (bottom) prevalence setting. The investment costs in millions in US$
(2007) are depicted on the horizontal axis and health benefits (infections averted) on the vertical axis. The points shown represent the infections
averted and investment costs of each screening strategy. The origin represents baseline, a policy of neither screening nor isolation. The incremental
ratios of D effectiveness to costs are represented by the slopes of the lines connecting these points. The decreasing slope illustrates the diminishing
return on investment when extending the selective PCR to universal screening in both settings. The strategy ‘Universal Chromogenic’ is dominated
by ‘Selective PCR’ (higher costs, less health benefits), and is therefore not considered a relevant option. The incremental investment costs, infections
averted and incremental cost-effectiveness ratio between selected strategies are shown in the table beneath the graphs. iCER incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio; Chr. Chromogenic.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014783.g003
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 March 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 3 | e14783[27]. The lack of effective regulation to ensure regional
compliance with MRSA screening inhibits single hospitals from
screening because it is less cost-effective to be the only screening
hospital in the region. It also demonstrates that extensive pre-
emptive isolation is a relatively costly infection control strategy
when a test with a low test delay is used. By using a chromogenic
media-based test after 24 h of incubation, the isolation costs can be
reduced, because of the shorter test delay and the higher
specificity, but results in fewer infections averted.
When extending the time frame, the costs per infection averted
decrease (figure 5), because the declining prevalence of each
additional year is compared to the higher baseline prevalence. A
lower isolation effectiveness (50% instead of 80%), which might be
due to less effective use of barrier precautions or hand hygiene, or
reflect the potential of transmission while in cohort isolation if
precautions are not followed well, increases the aCER by 50%.
The model outcome is very sensitive to the cost of isolation. If we
assume that the additional costs of single room isolation are on
average $100 per day, the aCER increases more than 80%. Higher
additional isolation costs benefit strategies with a short test delay.
At thresholds for isolation costs of $25 and $51 for high and
medium prevalence settings respectively, ‘Selective PCR’ becomes
more cost-effective than ‘Selective Chromogenic’, and at thresh-
olds of $45 and $106 for high and medium prevalence settings
respectively, ‘Selective PCR’ becomes dominant over ‘Selective
Chromogenic’ (i.e. less costly and more effective).
Our results contrast with another recent economic analysis [13],
which recommended screening with a chromogenic media-based
test after 24 hours of incubation over PCR-based screening. An
important difference is that this study assumed an equal test delay
of 1 day for both tests, and used a sensitivity and specificity for the
chromogenic media-based test of 98.0% and 99.8%, respectively,
where we have used 76.6% and 98.6%, based upon a recently
performed meta-analysis [28].
Study limitations
The outcomes from our study depend on the validity of the
transmission model. To assess the validity of our model we
conducted extensive sensitivity analyses and have provided
estimates around our estimated aCER. We did not perform a
full probabilistic sensitivity analysis to estimate the impact of the
uncertainty in the assumed model parameter values, because the
computation time required would be unfeasibly long for the type
of model we used. Instead, the impact of varying model
parameters was investigated using one-way sensitivity analysis.
Because a model remains a simplification of real life situations,
the inherent limitations should be discussed. No limit was set on
isolation capacity and it was assumed that all identified carriers
were isolated, with corresponding isolation costs. However, this
ideal policy will not always be realized [29]. Failure to isolate will
reduce the total isolation effectiveness, but will also reduce costs. In
our analyses we considered isolation not to be perfect (80%
reduction in infectiousness), but costs were always incurred. This
will overestimate the costs per infection averted. We assumed an
average rate of infection for all carriers, whereas this rate may
differ between patients in ICU and in a regular ward.
There are no published estimates on the additional cost (if any)
of a patient in a single room versus a semi-private room or a ward
[30], and consequently we have omitted these costs from our
analysis, as others have done [9,15]. Some authors have included
estimates based on construction costs [9], on the maintenance of
the additional floor space required [13], or on revenue lost [31].
These approaches can be valid but are strongly determined by
local conditions, such as the type of infrastructure, the shared use
of isolation facilities for other pathogens and the level of hospital
occupancy. Some additional opportunity costs are likely to occur
in a hospital operating at near full capacity, due to bed blocking
[32]. We have used sensitivity analysis to estimate the impact of
additional single room isolation costs.
As our main outcome measure was investment costs per
infection averted, our calculations neglect the benefit of patients of
not having MRSA. The healthcare utilization costs of treating
MRSA infection are driven by the patient’s length of stay. The
length of stay varies considerably across hospitals and even
between wards in a single hospital. For hospitals with a relatively
short length of stay, the screening strategies investigated in this
study will result in lower cost savings and lower net benefits than
shown in figure 6.
For a more comprehensive determination of cost-effectiveness
from the societal perspective, more data is needed on the value of
averted infections in terms of the additional survival, quality of life
and the costs of MRSA infection, during hospital stay as well as
after discharge. One would also hope to include the potential
negative effects of isolation on quality of care [33] and possibly the
costs of damage to hospital reputations or subsequent litigations.
Yet, with the aforementioned limitations, this analysis provides a
Figure 4. Results of the sensitivity analysis of test character-
istics. The costs of selective PCR-based screening are depicted on the
horizontal axis and health benefits (infections averted) on the vertical
axis. The left graph shows the combined results of alternately varying
the test’s sensitivity and specificity from 50% to 100%, with increments
of 5%. The right graph shows the test delay varied from 0 to 5 days,
with increments of 0.5 day, for different pre-emptive isolation
strategies: No pre-emptive isolation (diamonds), pre-emptive isolation
of ‘flagged’ patients only, i.e. the base-case scenario (squares), and full
pre-emptive isolation, i.e. ‘flagged’ patients as well as ‘high risk’ patients
(triangles).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014783.g004
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 March 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 3 | e14783robust estimate of the costs of averting MRSA infection through
screening and isolation. Our estimates can be considered in
combination with the hospital’s own estimates, e.g. the additional
costs of single room isolation and savings of averted infections, to
support decision making on cost-effective infection control
strategies.
Conclusions
Based upon our simulation model, three important conclusions
can be drawn related to MRSA admission screening:
(1) Excluding any financial benefits from averted infections, the
choice of strategy depends on the setting, the costs of isolation and
the hospital’s willingness to pay to avert infection. In both settings,
selective screening with a chromogenic media-based test is the
least costly strategy in terms of the cost per infection averted. More
infections can be averted by replacing the chromogenic media-
based test with a PCR test, at additional costs. The additional
infections that can be averted with universal screening with PCR
are relatively costly.
(2) The ranking of strategies is sensitive to additional daily costs
of single room isolation. At thresholds of $45 and $106, in high and
medium prevalence settings respectively, selective screening with
PCR becomes dominant over selective chromogenic media-based
screening.
(3) Assuming $17,645 benefit per infection averted, all evaluated
strategies using base-case assumptions are cost-saving with the
exception of universal screening with PCR in a medium
prevalence setting. The most cost-saving strategies in high and
medium prevalence settings are selective screening with PCR and
selective screening with a chromogenic media based test,
respectively.
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